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A qualitative approach to risk management of hazardous materials in the Netherlands: lessons 
learned from 7 sluice cases 
The debate on risks related to hazardous materials has intensified in the 
Netherlands since the 1980s. Following the Bijlmer airplane disaster in 
Amsterdam in 1992 and the SE Fireworks disaster in the city of Enschede in 
2000, society has become more aware of the risks involved in the production, 
storage and transport of hazardous materials. In order to prevent disasters and 
improve the safety of those living in the vicinity of risky activities, the Dutch 
government implemented its external safety policy (externe veiligheidsbeleid). 
External safety policy aims to control the risks for civilians relating to the 
production, storage and use of hazardous materials as well as transport by road, 
rail or water and through pipelines. 
 
The Dutch government has specified generic external safety norms to direct 
decision making. However, risks are calculated with models which not only use 
transport of hazardous materials as their input but also population numbers in the 
adjacent area. Since not many people live directly adjacent to dams and sluices, it 
would seem improbable that an incident would create many problems due to low 
population density. However, if sluices and floodgates were destroyed by an 
incident involving hazardous materials, the primary function would be 
diminished, resulting in new risks. The normally used quantitative approach does 
not therefore seem to be a sufficient means to control risks. 
 
In collaboration with Rijkswaterstaat, the executive arm of the Dutch Ministry of 
Infrastructure and the Environment, we conducted seven case studies to test an 
alternative approach. By using risk inventories and evaluations, questionnaires 
and interviews, we developed a new qualitative risk assessment method. This 
paper outlines our approach and presents the effectiveness of a qualitative risk 
analysis for controlling external safety risks related to water transport. We will 
particularly reflect on its effectiveness with regard to controlling risks at sluices 
and dams. 





It is no secret that the Netherlands is prone to the risk of flooding due to the fact that the 
country is largely located below sea level and has struggled to keep its head above 
water. Throughout history, however, the Dutch have transformed the risk of living in a 
low delta into a strategic advantage by using rivers and the North Sea for water 
transport. Furthermore, the Dutch have created a vast network of waterways such as 
canals with sluices and floodgates to ensure safety, as well as to provide a way to 
transport large volumes of hazardous materials, amongst other things. Of the over 81 
million tons of hazardous materials that are transported each year, 67.8 million tons are 
transported over waterways. The remaining volumes are transported by road (9.5 
million tons) and rail (3.5 million tons) (Railcargo, 2012). 
The transport of hazardous materials creates risks to adjacent areas and the local 
residents. The general debate on these involuntary risks involving - but not limited to - 
hazardous materials has intensified since the 1980s. In the Netherlands, this debate 
intensified following several major disasters. One of these disasters was the accident in 
1992 involving a Boeing aircraft which crashed into a large apartment building in 
Amsterdam, resulting in 43 casualties among residents. A second disaster was the 
explosion of the SE Fireworks storage facility in 2000, which destroyed an entire 
neighbourhood in the city of Enschede, killing 23 people. The risks related to the 
transport of hazardous materials received particular public attention after several near 
misses with freight trains in the cities of Tilburg (2007) and Barendrecht (2009, 2011) 
for example, but also following the recent derailment of a Dutch train in the Belgium 
village of Wetteren. 
As a result of these disasters, society has become more aware of the risks 
involved in the production, storage and transport of hazardous materials. In the 
 
 
Netherlands, this has led to more attention for the institutionalisation of risk 
management approaches in order to prevent disasters and improve the safety of people 
living in areas adjacent to risky activities. This has been formalised in what is known in 
the Netherlands as external safety policy. External safety policy aims to control the risks 
for civilians related to the production, storage and use of hazardous materials (for 
example: fireworks, liquefied petroleum gas, ammunition), the transport of hazardous 
materials by road, rail or water and through pipelines, and the use of airports (Ministerie 
van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2006). The term ‘external’ is used to denote that these risks 
involve civilians residing in areas adjacent to these risky activities. If a person working 
with hazardous materials has an accident, this would be referred to as internal safety or 
occupational risk. The Dutch external safety policy is based on quantified generic norms 
for acceptable external safety levels (we will elaborate on these norms in more detail in 
the next section). 
The quantitative approach to support policy making with respect to the risks for 
residential areas adjacent to risky activities has become dominant in Dutch policy 
making (see Van der Vlies, 2011). Risks are calculated for particular spots using 
quantitative models and the outcome is a figure that is compared to the norm to 
determine whether this is a safe or unsafe situation. However, quantitative risk 
assessment is only possible using models that not only use transport of hazardous 
materials as their input, but also population numbers in the adjacent area. Since not 
many people live directly adjacent to dams and sluices, it would seem improbable that 
an incident would create many problems due to low population density. However, if 
sluices and floodgates were destroyed by an incident involving hazardous materials, the 
primary function would be diminished, resulting in new risks.  
 
 
In collaboration with Rijkswaterstaat, the executive arm of the Dutch Ministry 
of Infrastructure and the Environment, and more specifically its Dienst 
IJsselmeergebied (District IJsselmeergebied), we conducted seven case studies to test an 
alternative approach. This stems from the fact that the Rijkswaterstaat Dienst 
IJsselmeergebied territory and the respective water defences are mainly located in areas 
with a low population density. However, if an incident occurred near one of the sites, 
although human lives might not be directly affected, the flood defences could be out of 
order for a lengthy period of time, making the area vulnerable to flooding.
 
Figure 1: eight sites within Rijkswaterstaat Dienst IJsselmeergebied’s territory 




Using risk inventories and evaluations, questionnaires and interviews, among others, we 
developed a qualitative risk assessment. This paper outlines our approach and presents 
the effectiveness of a qualitative risk analysis for controlling external safety risks in 
relation to water transport. We will particularly reflect on its effectiveness with regard 
to controlling risks at sluices and dams.  
The sites that will be elaborated in general terms are the Houtribsluizencomplex, 
Naviduct, Krabbersgat, Stevinsluis, Lorentzsluizencomplex, Roggebotsluis and the 
Nijkerkersluis. These sites are all complexes of sluices that may be used as floodgates, 
but also as an aquaduct (Naviduct) or as waterways. As shown in Figure 1, there are 8 
sites, although we present the results of 7 cases. This is due to the fact that IJsseloog is 
not a sluice or dam, but a depot for sludge dredged from various Dutch rivers and 
canals. This depot is therefore not discussed in the remainder of this paper.  
In the following, we will first present how external safety risks are typically 
controlled in the Netherlands together with the pros and cons (section two). We will 
then give an overview of our work, in which we will consecutively elaborate on 
Rijkswaterstaat’s need, the outline for our research for a different risk assessment 
approach and on our research methods. We will also elaborate on the research method 
and how it worked in practice. In the final section, we will present the conclusions and 
discuss the most important findings from our research. 
Controlling external safety risks: the institutionalised approach 
Generic norms 
As mentioned, the Dutch government has specified generic external safety norms to 
direct decision making in real world situations, aimed at avoiding conflicts related to 
external safety policy.  In this respect, norms must be seen as formal rules that are laid 
 
 
down in various laws and government guidelines. These norms have been established in 
order to provide a minimum level of protection for civilians from risks related to the 
production, transport, use and storage of hazardous materials. Furthermore, this 
approach prevents health risks being passed on to groups of people living in areas near 
chemical plants, airports or electricity pylons, or to people who, for various reasons, are 
more sensitive to environmental pollution. The norms are expressed in certain 
acceptable levels of risk, which can be compared to the risk calculations made with 
computer models. 
The first norm used to describe and limit risk relates to individual risk (IR)1. 
This is the annual probability that an unprotected person will die as a result of an 
accident involving hazardous materials at a certain spot if that person resides there for a 
full year. The risk is visualised on a map by dots which act as spatial contours (see 
figure 2). The maximum permitted risk for ‘new’ situations as laid down in Dutch law is 
1*10-6. This means that an arbitrary person is exposed to a statistical risk of one in a 
million per year to die due to an accident with hazardous materials.  
Dutch authorities have made a distinction between vulnerable and less 
vulnerable objects within the IR contours. This distinction is based on societal ideas on 
protection of people. Vulnerable objects are objects that need more protection, 
including, hospitals, houses, schools, large office buildings and shops. Less vulnerable 
objects are objects which need less protection, such as small office buildings (smaller 
than 1500 m2), restaurants, gyms or swimming pools. A risk that is lower than once 
every million years is acceptable according to Dutch policy for vulnerable objects. By 
contrast, less vulnerable objects may be present within the 10-6 contour. 
                                                











Figure 2: Individual risk near a track 
 
The second way to describe risk is in terms of group risk (GR). This is the 
cumulative probability for each year that at least 10, 100 or 1000 people will die as a 
direct result of their presence in the influence area of an establishment or transport route 
following an incident involving hazardous materials. This is visualised on a logarithmic 
scale by using the fN curve, where f represents the frequency of an accident and N the 












Figure 3 shows that the orientation value for transporting hazardous materials 
for 10 victims or more is 10-4 (once every 10,000 years). For 100 victims or more, it is 
10-6 (once every 1 million years) and for 1000 victims or more, it is 10-8 (once every 
100 million years). The GR value is calculated for each individual kilometre of a 
waterway. When the orientation value for the GR is met, a line can be drawn in figure 3 
that does not cross the diagonal curve representing the orientation value. The curve that 
is drawn is then still in the area below the orientation value. When it crosses the line and 
thus enters the area above the orientation value, the GR is too high according to Dutch 
policy standards. When the GR is exceeded or increases, the responsible authorities 
must take this into account when deciding on new urban or transport plans, because the 
orientation value is a guiding value. This means that the responsible authorities must 
limit the increase in group risk or a possible exceeding of the orientation value wherever 
possible, but it is not obliged to lower it to values below the orientation value2. 
To calculate and estimate transport risks for water, road and rail transport, the 
Netherlands Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment provided a standardised 
risk model, the so-called RBMII model. RBMII is an abbreviation of the Dutch name 
Risico Berekening Methodiek II (Second Risk Calculation Methodology). The RBMII 
model is the follow-up to the model applied in the past called IPORBM and has several 
adaptations and improvements. To quantify risks, a number of standardisations are used 
to arrive at a risk value. This is laid down in a series of ‘coloured’ books: the Red Book 
describes the methods for calculating probabilities, the Yellow Book describes the 
methods for calculating consequences, the Green Book stipulates how to describe 
damage, while the Purple Book is the guideline for performing a risk analysis itself, 
providing guidance on the use of these books, standard scenario selection and frequency 
                                                
2 This is not without complications as Van der Vlies (2011) indicates 
 
 
attribution (RIVM, 2001; Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat et al., 2004). The 
assumption is that these risks can be controlled in a more or less routine way: risk 
norms are determined by policy rules and the core of risk management is to calculate 
the need for risk limitation and to ensure that this policy is enforced. This seems to fit 
well with Dutch policy on environmental issues that is dominated by a regulatory 
approach based on generic norms that have to be lived up to (De Roo, 2003). 
As with every model, risk models are based on assumptions on determining 
factors and their causal relationships. For example, these models assume transferability 
to the future of the multiplicative relationship between the probability of accidents and 
their effects, assuming that extrapolation of data on the past offers a reliable 
representation of future situations. The probability function in the risk models, for 
example, is calculated by multiplying data on the frequency of accidents by the 
probability of failure of (for example) a tank wagon filled with hazardous materials. The 
frequency of accidents takes different factors of failing into account, such as (in case of 
transport) the speed of a vessel or the strength of the hull. The effect of a possible 
leakage is calculated using variables like the amount of hazardous materials released 
and the impact on the public (‘Is the substance toxic or explosive?’), the number of 
people living in the adjacent area and the distance between the accident and the built-up 
area (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat et al., 2004). 
Research approach 
Institutional background 
Rijkswaterstaat is part of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment and 
responsible for the design, construction, management and maintenance of the main 
infrastructure facilities in the Netherlands. This includes the main road and waterway 
 
 
networks and water systems. Rijkswaterstaat is seriously committed to the safety of its 
personnel and the user of its network. As such, Rijkswaterstaat targets zero casualties 
and zero serious injuries per year (Rijkswaterstaat, 2012).  
After an incident on the A6 motorway in October 2009, in which three people 
were seriously injured as a result of a bascule bridge suddenly opening, Rijkswaterstaat 
embarked on a large scale research project on the safety of its moving objects, such as 
bridges and sluices. In order to prevent such accidents from occurring in the future, 
Rijkswaterstaat introduced the Programma Aanpak Beweegbare Objecten, (Programme 
approach moveable objects) or PrABO. In PrABO, several safety and security aspects 
were addressed in depth, such as occupational and fire safety, security against deliberate 
disturbances, but also external safety.  
As we stated in the outline paragraph of this paper, quantitative risk assessment 
can only be performed using models that not only use transport of hazardous materials 
as their input, but also population numbers in the adjacent area. Since not many people 
live directly adjacent to dams and sluices, it would seem improbable that an incident 
would create many problems due to low population density. However, if sluices and 
floodgates were destroyed by an incident involving hazardous materials, the primary 
function would be diminished, creating new risks. Rijkswaterstaat therefore wanted to 
know how external safety aspects could be taken into account in terms of managing the 
effects and preventing incidents involving the transport of hazardous materials. In this 
case, Rijkswaterstaat asked ARCADIS to come up with an innovative approach to 
qualitatively manage risks regarding transport of hazardous materials and estimate the 
costs of these measures. In the following, we will focus primarily on external safety 
aspects, as the method we used was innovative and non-existent at the time. We will not 
therefore focus on other safety aspects, but only on external safety. Firstly, we will 
 
 
explore theories on risk calculations, as these were used to build up a view as to whether 
quantitative risk assessment was a practical method for managing risks. Secondly, we 
will look at the different events that could cause negative effects and thirdly, we will 
show how we created criteria for checklists and a research method to thoroughly assess 
the risks at the seven sites. 
From quantitative to qualitative risk analysis 
Transport of hazardous materials can be seen as a risky activity, but what does risk 
mean in this respect? Although there are various definitions of risk, these definitions 
have several aspects in common. Risks are often defined in terms of probabilities and 
consequences of events that are valued negatively (see for example Kaplan & Garrick, 
1981; Kunreuther et al., 1984; Klinke & Renn, 2002; Høj & Kröger, 2002; Paté-Cornell, 
2002; Vrijling et al., 1998). Negative events can be anything from tsunamis, volcano 
eruptions, the unknown side effects of nano technology to train derailments. 
Risk assessment generally involves the analysis of certain hypothetical scenarios 
of accidents (causes, chains of effects, reactions etc.). After designing these scenarios 
for the specific situation, they are subjected to quantitative and/or qualitative appraisals 
(see e.g. Rosmuller, 2001). Whereas quantitative risk assessments are based on 
mathematical and statistical models, qualitative risk assessments are based on expert 
knowledge of values, relationships between actors and factors, potential impacts and 
necessary conditions. 
There are a number of objections to be made to quantitative risk assessment. 
Several authors, such as Fischer (2003) and Healy (2001), have objected to this 
quantitative standard-based evaluation on acceptability of risks as they perceive them to 
be a technocratic basis for risk management and design of risk policy rather than an 
adequate representation of reality. Also, the concept of risk is much richer than can be 
 
 
expressed by some simple numbers. A broader view should be taken into account in 
decisions as to whether or not a real world situation is socially acceptable.  
Various other studies can be found in national and international literature, 
presenting similar and critical notes on the dominant approach to quantitative risk 
assessments. According to Bedford and Cooke (2001), risk analysts must bear in mind 
that the calculation of an fN curve is based on uncertain data and hence is no more than 
a rough estimate, rather than an exact presentation of risk results (see also Vrijling et al, 
1998). In a comprehensive review of over ten quantitative risk models developed and 
applied in four countries, Mandl and Lathrop (1983) showed that there were large 
differences in the content of the reports for the procedure for (in their case) the siting of 
a liquid natural gas terminal. Depending on the assumptions chosen, the models used 
and the formats for presenting the results, the risks estimated for residents near the site 
varied by a factor of eight. The authors explain this by how personal judgements 
influenced the analyses (see also Kunreuther et al., 1984). Short (1989) and Renn 
(1992) argued that quantitative risk analyses help decision-makers estimate the expected 
physical harm and provide the best available knowledge about actual damage that is 
logically or empirically linked to each possible action. However, they also stress that the 
outcome of the analyses is based on available statistics and that these can be faulty. This 
means that the outcome of models is indeed uncertain and that the outcomes of these 
analyses should therefore not be interpreted as absolute truths. Instead, the information 
should be used to improve decision making through specifying more options and 
forcing clearer trade-offs. 
The previous citations are mainly related to risk models from a more theoretical 
point of view. Moreover, they do not focus specifically on the Dutch institutional 
situation. However, the Hazardous Substances Council of the Netherlands (Adviesraad 
 
 
Gevaarlijke Stoffen) wrote two insightful reports on quantitative risk assessment 
practice in the Netherlands (AGS, 2006; 2010a) in which the Council argues that 
decision making concerning external safety must be reformed. The 2006 report 
concluded that improvements should be made concerning the transparency and 
verifiability of the models and accident frequencies. The 2010 report was even more 
critical than the first one. Not only were the transparency and verifiability found to be 
insufficient, the robustness, validity and relevance concerning improving safety were 
also qualified as very poor. Nevertheless, these have formed the basis for safety policy 
and decision-making for transport by rail, road and water in the recent past. As such, the 
council concluded that: 
‘Calculations with the prescribed model have degenerated to a ritual, creating a 
false sense of safety. Permits are granted if the arithmetic yields a particular 
outcome rather than checking whether people have really thought about safety, let 
alone whether the latest knowledge and insights are used’. (AGS, 2010b, translated 
from Dutch). 
Moreover, the council states that the system in which the quantitative risk assessments 
are made do not do justice to the complexity of the practice in which decision making 
takes place (AGS, 2010b). Furthermore, when an actor wishes to control the probability 
and the effect of negative events, measures are taken to manage risks. A big downside 
to taking risk-reducing measures is that there are numerous measures that can be taken 
in theory, but only a few that can be taken into account by the risk model. So even if an 
actor is willing to lower risks quantitatively, there are very few measures that can be 
quantified, as a result of which the effect on the quantified risk is zero. 
These notions and critical remarks lead to the idea that nothing good may come 
from quantitative risk assessments, although that is obviously a too narrow-minded 
view. Van der Vlies (2011) stated that instead of seeing the outcome of quantitative risk 
 
 
assessments as the absolute truth, the outcome should be used as a decision supporting 
tool, because the basis of the quantitative risk assessment method in itself, the 
mathematical foundations etc., are correct. This means that if one wanted to know what 
might go wrong when transporting hazardous materials, the qualitative scenarios that 
lead to failure of transport of hazardous materials are still very useful and deserve a 
thorough elaboration over the quantitative outcome.  
If we now return to the scope of the research, we find two fundamental 
challenges that should be met. Firstly, the risk analysis should be based on a qualitative 
perspective of avoiding incidents with hazardous materials rather than a quantitative 
approach. Secondly, the qualitative criteria should be based on literature and a proven 
and practical method for controlling risks. 
We then took two documents to create criteria for the qualitative risk analyses. 
The first document was the nationally used Handleiding Risicoanalyse Transport, or 
Hart (Manual Risk Analysis Transport). The goal of the Hart document is to offer a 
framework for quantitative risk analysis, but in doing so also implicitly gives the criteria 
that generate a higher risk. To give an example: because all sites are located along 
roads, transporting hazardous materials at a speed higher than 80 kilometres per hour 
implies a higher risk. If an accident occurs, the possibility of the tank rupturing becomes 
greater. An example for the transport of hazardous materials by water is whether the 
waterway is a straight route or not. An accident between two vessels becomes more 
likely if the waterway is not straight but meanders.  
We therefore first produced an overview of these criteria and put these into table 





Risk criteria road transport Yes No 
The site is located next to a high speed road (>80 km/h)   
The site is located below ground level   
Is there a straight road   
There are clear lines of sight for road users (no obstacles present)   
Other traffic may cross the road (cyclists, motorcycles, vehicles etc.)   
There is sufficient lighting for road users to avoid incidents   
Risk criteria water transport Yes No 
Is the operating location directly at the lock chamber   
Is there a straight waterway   
Is the navigation angle to the sluice large enough   
Is there sufficient space for all ships to manoeuvre    
Do waterways cross near the site 
  
Is the channel situated higher than the adjacent area   
Are there any objects that may obstruct visibility (such as bridges)   
Are there any unforeseen objects in or near the lock chamber   
Is there sufficient lighting near the site   
Table 1: Risk criteria for road and water transport based on Rijkswaterstaat (2011) and 
ARCADIS (2011). 
 
Secondly, we used the same list together with a report written by ARCADIS for a 
national branch of Rijkswaterstaat (DVS, or Dienst Verkeer en Scheepvaart) in which 
measures were prescribed for different incident scenarios to either avoid these scenarios 
from happening or to mitigate their effects (ARCADIS, 2011). In this case, the 
scenarios were derived from the three main classes of hazardous materials that may be 
transported for both water and road transport: flammable liquids (such as gasoline), 
flammable gases (such as LPG) or toxic gases (such as ammonia). For flammable 
liquids, we looked at the dominant scenarios such as pool fires. The main scenario 
investigated for flammable gases was an explosion after an incident. For toxic gases, the 
main scenario was a toxic gas leakage. We also looked at the emergency response 
mechanisms that may be started in case of emergency. These criteria were then 
collected and are shown in Table 2. Notice that these risk lowering measures mainly 






General focus points Yes No 
Is there an escape route from the source of an incident to a safe spot   
Is there an evacuation signal in case of an emergency   
Are there fire alarms in the control room and in other areas of the site   
Is an emergency plan present   
Does the plan contain instructions and procedures during calamities   
Does the plan describe the responsibilities of people involved   
Does the plan contain alarm procedures   
Does the plan contain assembly points   
Does the plan contain maps of the site involved   
Does the plan contain an evacuation plan   
Focus points flammable liquids Yes No 
Are there gutters that may be used to divert flammable liquids from the built area   
Are there heat resistant constructions present between the infrastructure and the site   
Are the facades made of heat resistant materials   
Do the buildings have separate fire compartments   
Are flammable materials present at the location   
Are industrial fire fighting materials present   
Focus points flammable gases Yes No 
Are the facades made of blast resistant materials   
Is the construction of the building blast resistant (round shapes, few windows etc.)   
Are there blast resistant constructions between the infrastructure and the control room   
Do the buildings have separate fire compartments   
Are industrial fire fighting materials present   
Focus points toxic gases Yes No 
Can the windows be opened   
Can the air circulation system be shut down from the outside world in case of emergency   
Is this an automated system or not   
Are gas masks present   
Table 2: Qualitative focus points for reducing the effect of an incident with hazardous 
materials, based on Rijkswaterstaat (2011) and ARCADIS (2011). 
 
When the criteria were drafted for analysing the risks, a research method was designed  
to measure and analyse the risks. This will be discussed in the following section. 
Methodological approach 
We designed the research in such a way that there were three different types of research 
methods that we triangulated during our research. We first conducted desk research to 
assess the extent to which hazardous materials were actually transported through the 
sites. We then created interview protocols that we used to interview key employees on 
the sites. Finally, we created a protocol that we used for the site visits. These three 




As stated, we first conducted desk research to review the specific elements that we 
needed to take into account during our visits and for our research. We first looked at 
road and water transport maps to assess what types of hazardous materials were 
transported in the related areas. Based on Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (2008 & 
2009) and Rijksoverheid (2012), we then found that not all hazardous materials were 
transported. In Table 3, the sites and the possible hazardous incident scenarios are 
described. 






Lorentzsluizencomplex X X X 
Stevinsluis X X X 
Houtribsluizencomplex X   
Roggebotsluis X   
Naviduct X   
Krabbersgatcomplex X   
Nijkerkercomplex X X  
Table 3: Possible incident scenarios at the respective sites 
 
We also looked at literature of the sites. Prior to the site visits, we were given research 
documents on the sites, which included maps, specifications, contact names, etc., which 
we then investigated to see whether there was specific information that could be 
interesting for our inspections. Some of the things we found were that (for example) 
during heavy winds, ships were asked to use Krabbersgatcomplex instead of Naviduct, 
that Houtribsluizencomplex served as the crisis centre for all incidents in the whole 
IJsselmeergebied and that some of the sites were located lower than the road. Finally, 
we used Google Earth Pro to see what the sites looked like as a final preparation for the 
site visits. All this information was then used to further specify what we needed to ask 
and look for during our interview questions and our site visits. 
 
 
Interviews and site visits 
We requested Rijkswaterstaat to arrange interviews with at least two employees per site 
who needed to be familiar with the sites we visited. Some of the employees were 
familiar with more than one site and could therefore show us more than one site. 
Eventually we spoke to 14 people (maintenance engineers, control room employees and 
site managers) during our site visits in May 2012. They gave us a tour of the sites and 
explained their arrangements for risk management (if any) and how these were 
implemented. They were also asked questions to identify (for example) whether 
incidents had occurred in the past with hazardous materials, whether they were familiar 
with contingency plans and how they managed risks during their regular work. Our first 
visit was to the Houtribsluizencomplex, because this is the main site for this 
Rijkswaterstaat district. The site serves as the district’s crisis centre for all crises, from 
boats sinking (from recreational vessels to large cargo vessels) to flooding etc. This was 
also the largest of the sites with the most employees. We therefore hoped to learn a lot 
here that we could use during the other visits. 
It should be noted that the ARCADIS employees were carefully instructed and 
briefed on what to look out for during the site visits based on the drafted criteria. 
However, they were also told to have an open mind during the visits. They were also 
carefully instructed on how to perform in-depth interviews and ask follow up questions 
to the answers given by the Rijkswaterstaat employees. 
During the visits conducted by at least three ARCADIS employees (also for the 
purpose of investigating other safety aspects than external safety alone), all comments 
were carefully noted in minutes. We also took numerous photos of the sites and of 
potentially risky situations in order to analyse them further when we returned to the 
ARCADIS office.  
 
 
Analysing the risks 
The risk analyses were structured via a standardised form to compare risks. This form, 
created by Rijkswaterstaat, was mainly used for occupational risks, but we used the 
above-mentioned ideas to fill in the form. The form was a 14 point risk graph in which a 
number of different elements should be determined for a good understanding of the 
potential hazard and the risk mitigating measures to be taken. The risk graph looked as 
shown in Table 4: 










                
                
                
Table 4: Example of the 14 point risk graph 
 
The first four columns were used to identify the location at the site. In the aspect 
column, we identified which safety aspect was imminent (for example: pool fire due to 
an incident with flammable liquids). In the user column, we specified who was 
subjected to the risk, i.e. the site crew, maintenance personnel or passers-by. If the user 
column identified passers-by as an at-risk user group, we specify the group concerned: 
road users, waterway users or people in general.  
Then the most important columns followed. Firstly, the identified potential 
hazard needed to be filled in. Here a short description was written down, stating the risk 
(i.e. ‘Risk of injury or death’), followed by the potentially negative event (i.e. ‘caused 
by a fire or explosion’), followed by the cause of the event (i.e. ‘due to setting off 
fireworks near the sluice lock’). Then one or more photos were added to the form to 
support the statement.  
The columns E (effect), B (exposure), W (probability) and G (danger avoidance) 
needed to be filled in to automatically generate the risk score in accordance with the 
 
 
instructions for other safety aspects for which the form was used. E received a score of 
1 to 3, in which 1 stands for mild injuries, 2 for serious injuries and 3 for occurrence of 
fatalities. B received scores of 1 or 2, where 1 stands for temporary exposure and 2 for 
permanent. The probability (W) received a score of 1 to 3, in which 1 was used for a 
risk that is not likely during the lifespan of the complex, 2 for probable and 3 for a risk 
that is very likely to occur during the lifespan of the site. Finally, avoiding danger (G) 
was either possible (score 1) by changing the circumstances concerning the risk or 
impossible (score 2) when the circumstances were unavoidably unsafe. This resulted in 
a final score of 1 to 14, where scores of 1 to 3 were seen as low risks, 4 to 7 as mild 
risks, 8 to 11 as high risks and 12 to 14 as very high risks. 
The final two columns were used to state what sort of risk mitigation measures 
could be taken. These were either organisational or technical measures or 
documentation (i.e. new protocols or manuals). The final column was then used to give 
a risk reducing measure for the potential hazard specified earlier. 
For each visit, one of the visiting ARCADIS employees was responsible for 
filling in the risk graph. This was done after analysing all the data: the data from the 
desk research, the notes and minutes from the site visits, the photographs taken and the 
criteria we used for a qualitative approach. After the risk graph had been filled in 
completely, the project manager checked the risk graph for quality purposes. Where 
necessary, the first author made improvements to the analysis. Due to the fact that our 
approach was new and experimental, together with Rijkswaterstaat it was decided to 
have an extra quality check on all seven completed risk graphs with one of our 




We found a total of 34 risks for the seven sites combined, of which only one risk scored 
a low risk rating. 17 risks received a score in the medium category and 16 were placed 
in the high category. No very high risks were found. Furthermore, there was only one 
risk with a score of 10 (out of 14) and all other risks received a score between 3 and 9. 
Many of the risks were similar for each site, due to the nature of hazardous material 
transport itself, whereas some were quite specific due to the  use or design of the site. 
An example of the first category is the leakage of hazardous materials (whether 
flammable liquids or flammable or toxic gases), which may occur due to failure of the 
sluice itself or incorrect actions by either the ship’s personnel or the site. An example of 
the more specific risks found concerned gasoline tanks on the sites used for storage and 
the use of gasoline as engine fuel. Some shortcomings were found, such as an automatic 
valve that was not working properly at one site, while at another site there were three 
tanks of which it was unclear which two were still in use and which was not. Another 
example of a specific risk was a high speed expressway with a permitted speed of 100 
kilometres an hour passing under the Naviduct site. 
During our site visits and interviews with Rijkswaterstaat employees, we found 
that a number of Rijkswaterstaat’s employees were uneasy with the idea that hazardous 
materials were transported. It was not the transport itself that they felt anxious about but 
more the idea that people nearby might easily and accidentally set fire to transport of 
hazardous materials. There have been occasional incidents of teenagers setting off 
fireworks near the sluice lock, once while a vessel carrying flammable liquids was in 
the sluice lock. The fact that this was not a unique incident just at this site was proved 
by the discovery of a used skyrocket at the unmanned Krabbersgatcomplex. The 
personnel were also anxious that – in cases when road traffic was directed over sluice 
sites via viaducts – road users might throw their burning cigarettes away, which might 
 
 
then fall onto vessels carrying hazardous materials and set fire to them. Although we 
found the odds to be very slim, we took these remarks very seriously and used them as 
extra focus points in our remaining site visits and in the design of risk mitigating 
measures. Although they did not appear to be considered as important by other site 
employees, we nevertheless mentioned them as possible events at other sites for 
consistency purposes. The risk of people being injured or killed by incidents involving 
hazardous materials that were set on fire by fireworks or lit cigarettes is a recurring 
incident scenario. 
The scenarios we eventually identified were the following3: 
• Incidents involving fireworks: 11 times. These scenarios received scores of 7-9, 
depending on their respective scores on either probability (‘W’) or avoidance of 
danger (‘G’). In two cases, the probability received a score of 2 as these 
scenarios had already taken place in practice. The ‘E’ (effect) always scored 3 
points as the possibility of death was always imminent in the case of major 
calamities. 
• Erroneous actions by employees/failure of material: 7 times. These scenarios 
received a score of 7 or 8 and one 10, depending on their respective scores on 
either probability (‘W’) or avoidance of danger (‘G’). The ‘E’ (effect) always 
scored 3 points as the possibility of death was always imminent in the case of 
major calamities. 
                                                
3 Note that the total number of scenarios is 36 not 34. This is because there was some overlap 




• Incidents involving thrown away cigarettes or other burning materials: 6 times. 
These all scored 7 points as the scenarios were deemed highly improbable and 
avoidable. The ‘E’ (effect) always scored 3 points. 
• Incidents involving gasoline tanks: 6 times. These scenarios all scored 5 points, 
due to the fact that the ‘E’ score was now set to 2 (serious injuries). The idea 
behind this is that incidents involving a gasoline tank on a Rijkswaterstaat site 
need a longer period to develop and may be detected at an early stage. This 
means that the personnel present on the site are able to evacuate early too. 
• Incident with a tank-car carrying flammable liquids: 6 times. These scenarios all 
received a score of 8 points, because the ‘E’ score was 3 and the ‘G’ score was 
2. 
To mitigate the identified incident scenarios, we developed a number of different 
solutions. These were: 
• Signs indicating that smoking and setting off fireworks were prohibited: 11 
times. The idea behind this was to show local residents that there are hazards 
involved in using fireworks or smoking. This also applied to road users. 
• Heat resistant glass: 10 times. This was meant to reduce the effect of a pool fire 
after a spill. The window frames and windows were not suitable in the present 
situation, making this a very expensive investment (on average over 100,000 
euros per site4). 
• Installing a new railing: 6 times. This measure was intended to reduce the 
possibility of burning cigarettes falling from bridges and roads on the site. The 
                                                
4 We estimated the costs for all measures in a separate report (ARCADIS, 2012). We do not 
specify the exact costs here, as these were not made public.  
 
 
measure itself is quite expensive and also changes the appearance of 
(sometimes) historic bridges. 
• Two sites should be made airtight in case of an emergency involving toxic 
fumes in order to keep the toxic gases from the personnel. This was a very 
expensive measure too.  
• In one case, a valve from a tank storage should be replaced as it was broken 
• In one case, we advised erecting a fence around a gasoline tank. This was also 
for security purposes. 
• Finally we advised lowering the road speed at Naviduct from 100 kilometres an 
hour to reduce the possibility of an incident and the subsequent release of 
hazardous materials. 
For some measures, the costs certainly outweighed the benefits. This is the case, for 
example, with mitigating measures such as the instalment of heat resistant glass. The 
possibility of an incident involving hazardous materials is very small while the costs 
involved in reducing the effect are very high. We therefore mainly focussed on less 
expensive measures, such as signage and measures aimed at preventing incidents rather 
than mitigating the effect of an incident.  
Conclusion and discussion 
In this article, we focussed on a qualitative tool for analysing risks concerning the 
transport of hazardous materials that are transported near sluice complexes in the 
Netherlands. The tool we used was specially created for the inspection of seven sites in 
the Rijkswaterstaat Dienst IJsselmeergebied’s territory in the Netherlands. The seven 
cases we investigated could not be modelled in the traditional way, which is based on 
assessing the volume of transported materials and the people living in the adjacent 
 
 
areas. Since very few people reside within the area and because we wanted to develop a 
structured and methodologically sound risk analysis tool, we created the qualitative risk 
analysis model as described previously in this article. We found the 14 point risk graph, 
combined with the criteria based on Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (2008 & 
2009) and Rijksoverheid (2012), to be very useful. Together with the site visits and 
interviews with Rijkswaterstaat employees, we covered a much larger spectrum of 
possible incidents, effects and specifically risk mitigating measures than we would have 
achieved using a quantitative model.  
The seven cases show that there are not many risks for Rijkswaterstaat to take 
into account. As shown, there are a number of high risks, but these need some nuance. 
The possibility of an incident involving hazardous materials is very small, while the 
costs of reducing the effect are very high. This also indicates a disadvantage of the 
system with the 14-point risk graph, namely that some risks with an extremely low 
probability of occurrence can still receive a relatively high score. This is based on the 
minimal range of the risk graph for its four basic criteria: the effect, exposure, 
probability of occurrence and danger avoidance. In our cases, this was not considered a 
problem because we did not estimate the risk level, but wanted to structure the risks in 
an organised way. By doing so, we created an overview of possible incidents and how 
they may be managed by implementing mitigating measures.  
A number of technical measures hereby estimated (e.g. application of heat 
resistant glass or instalment of a new railing) are in our opinion for consideration and 
not deemed essential risk mitigation options. Moreover, these measures are extremely 
expensive and may outweigh the benefits. This is the case, for example, with mitigating 
measures such as instalment of heat resistant glass, whereas other measures are very 
easy to take, are not expensive and may benefit risk mitigation (putting up forbidden 
 
 
signs for example5). These types of measures would never have been taken into account 
if the ‘classical’ quantitative method had been used. In this method,  risks are calculated 
for particular spots using quantitative models and the outcome is a figure that is 
compared to the norm to determine whether we are dealing with a safe or an unsafe 
situation.  
In this respect, Van der Vlies (2011) stated that one of the biggest disadvantages 
of quantitative modelling of risks is the fact that very few risk mitigating measures can 
also be weighed quantitatively.  Very many measures are therefore not implemented, 
despite certainly being beneficial for risk mitigation purposes, because the institutional 
setting of risk analysis is primarily focussed on lowering risks quantitatively, rather then 
truly focussing on the purpose of risk management: controlling risks. Although in 
practice qualitative analyses are increasingly added (often based on expert knowledge 
on developed scenarios), such additional ‘soft’ analyses do not have a clear institutional 
context in which they are used except for the justification duty when the GR is exceeded 
(Van der Vlies, 2011). The approach we used in these cases is also in line with Healy 
(2003), who concluded that a more substantive dialogue between natural and the social 
sciences is needed, by which is meant that it should not be technical analyses alone that 
determine risks. 
                                                
5 Although signage in itself does not prevent people from throwing cigarettes or other burning 
materials in the sluice area and we could not control the deliberateness of the behaviour, both 
the research team and Rijkswaterstaat believed this was a valuable measure. At the time of 
the site visits, there were no signs present to make people aware of the fact that hazardous 
materials were transported. Follow-up research should indicate whether there are still 




Taking all this into account, we recommend that this qualitative approach needs 
follow-up research in other cases of transport as well. We recommend using this 
approach for rail and road transport too, as these modes of transport are seen as higher 
risks than water transport. Because these modes of transport run closer to built up areas, 
it may be useful to test this qualitative approach in real-life cases as well. We can also 
recommend that risk managers use a similar qualitative approach when they are 
required to justify plans according to the Guide to the Group Risk Justification Duty 
(Handreiking Verantwoordingsplicht Groepsrisico). In practice, this means that the 
responsible authorities must take into account people’s personal emergency 
preparations, ability to deal with possible disasters, alternatives to the proposed plan and 
possible risk reducing measures. This is not yet performed in a structured way. The 
qualitative method presented here may be very useful for organising a structured work 
method. Follow-up research should highlight whether this is the case, but our findings 
indicate that the results are truly promising. 
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